Sharon Smith  Petitioner/Appellee v.  Keith Smith Respondent/Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2015 
Sharon Smith Petitioner/Appellee v. Keith Smith Respondent/
Appellant 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Smith v Smith, No. 20150354 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3682 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner/ Appellee, 
V. 
KEITH SMITH, 
Respondent/ Appel 1 ant. 
Appeal No. 20150354 
(Dist. Ct. Case No. 134300466) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
.r 
Appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, each 
entered on March 26, 2015, by the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Robert W. 
Adkins presiding. 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 
Jaime Topham, Esq. 
Law Office of Jaime Topham, PLLC 
291 N Race Street 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Troy L. Booher, Esq. 
Julie J. Nelson, Esq. 
Zimmerman Jones Booher 
Felt Building, Fourth Floor 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
Michael D. Black (#9132) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
101 South 200 East, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801 )532-7840 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 2 5 2015 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner/ Appellee, 
v. 
KEITH SMITH, 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20150354 
(Dist. Ct. Case No. 134300466) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
.t 
Appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, each 
entered on March 26, 2015, by the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Robert W. 
Adkins presiding. 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 
Jaime Topham, Esq. 
Law Office of Jaime Topham, PLLC 
291 N Race Street 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Troy L. Booher, Esq. 
Julie J. Nelson, Esq. 
Zimmerman Jones Booher 
Felt Building, Fourth Floor 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
Michael D. Black (#9132) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
IO 1 South 200 East, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801 )532-7840 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LIST OF PARTIES 
The following are parties to this appeal: 
1. Defendant/ Appellant Keith Smith 
2. Plaintiff/ Appellee Sharon Smith 
,.C' 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the District Court err by interpreting the Smith Family Trust provision 
dividing financial accounts as not applying to the financial accounts held by Sharon 
Smith at the time of the divorce? 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was argued by counsel in closing arguments at trial, 
and is plainly shown in the Trial Court's final orders that are the subject of this appeal. 
R.181: 129-131 (Trial Transcript); R.165-166(Decree of Divorce); R.157-159(Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of an unambiguous trust instrument is a question 
,.t 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the district 
court. See Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ,JiJ 27-28, 285 P.3d 815, 823. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no governing constitutional or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from a divorce action in the Third District Court, 
Judge Robert Adkins presiding (the "Trial Court"). Petitioner Sharon Smith (referred to 
herein as '"Sharon" for the sake of clarity) filed a Petition for Divorce on October 25, 
2013. The Trial Court held a bench trial on February 2, 2015. At the resolution of the 
bench trial, the Trial Court granted a divorce and made findings and rulings regarding the 
division of property, among other things. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
1 
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Decree of Divorce were entered on March 26, 2015. The Appellant, Keith Smith 
(referred to herein as "Keith") filed a Notice of Appeal on April 21, 2015. 
At issue in this appeal is the property division regarding two brokerage accounts 
totaling approximately $593,000 held in Sharon's name. The Trial Court ruled that they 
were Sharon's separate property, based upon the Trial Court's erroneous interpretation of 
the Smith Family Trust, which by its plain terms should make such accounts joint 
property, divided equally between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on December 15, 1979. R.156. On September 22, 2006, 
the parties executed the Smith Family Trust, including Schedule A thereto. Trial Ex. 2, 
pg. 25, R.181 :92-93(Trial Tr.). The Smith Family Trust was drafted by an_ att~flley 
retained by Sharon. R.181 :25, 55-56 (Trial Tr.). The Smith Family Trust, executed 
during the course of the marriage, included a provision (the "Financial Accounts 
Provision") in which Sharon quitclaimed to Keith one-half of 
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all 
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all 
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or 
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. The Schedule then allocated to Sharon 
all right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest of Sharon 
L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an 
Arizona Limited Partnership. 
(referred to herein as the "Limited Partnership"). Id. At the time, all distributions from 
the Limited Partnership were going into joint accounts for common marital use-exactly 
2 
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what the Financial Accounts Provision requires. R.181 :58(Trial Tr.). Approximately six 
years after signing the Smith Family Trust, Sharon received a distribution from the 
Limited Partnership and deposited that money in 1) a newly opened Zions Bank account 
with a balance of $171,068.19 at the time of the divorce, and 2) An LPL Financial 
account (previously Edward Jones) with a balance of $422,159.21 at the time of the 
divorce (the "Brokerage Accounts"). R.181 :33-34, 52(Trial Tr.). At trial, the Court did 
not find that the Smith Family Trust was ambiguous, but did rule that the two provisions 
cited above were conflicting, and ruled that the financial account provision did not apply 
to the financial accounts containing the distribution from the Limited Partnership. R.165-
166(Divorce Decree). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 2006 the parties signed the Smith Family Trust, which contained a provision 
that split all financial accounts equally between the parties. The Trial Court interpreted 
that provision as not applying to the Brokerage Accounts in Sharon's name. That 
interpretation was error, as the Brokerage Accounts were subject to that provision under 
the plain language of the Smith Family Trust. The Trial Court's error is also 
demonstrated by the operation of the Smith Family Trust as a whole, and the extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' conduct. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling on the 
interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and the division of the Brokerage Accounts 
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to split the Brokerage Accounts 
equally between the parties. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
The sole issue in this appeal is the proper division of two financial accounts, a 
Zions Bank money market account and an LPL brokerage account, both held in 
Petitioner's name (the "Brokerage Accounts"). In 2006, Sharon and Keith executed a 
Smith Family Trust, which provided that they would equally split 
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all 
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all 
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or 
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (the "Financial Accounts Provision"). There is no argument about the 
effectiveness or enforceability of the Smith Family Trust. In breach of this agreement, 
Sharon argued that the Brokerage Accounts were her sole and separate property because 
. .t 
the funds therein (at least most of them) came from distributions from her Limited 
Partnership, an inherited asset. The Smith Family Trust also mentions the Limited 
Partnership, and states that Sharon alone is entitled to "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in 
and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. The Court interpreted the Financial Accounts Provision as not 
applying to the Brokerage Accounts, based on the Court's belief as to the origin of the 
funds in the Brokerage Accounts and its interpretation of the Financial Accounts 
Provision as not applying to financial accounts whose funds originated from the Limited 
Partnership. The entire oral ruling of the Court on the subject (which is consistent with 
the written order), is as follows: 
4 
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In trying to reconcile Exhibit A to the Smith Family Trust, the Court is 
looking at No. 4 on Exhibit A, and it says, "All interest, title and interest 
in the following," and then it says, "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in 
the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona limited 
partnership," and that was to go to Mrs. Smith. The Court believes that 
all interest in the - of Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership included distributions. That they were simply part of 
the partnership, and the Court is interpreting No. 4 to mean all those 
distributions were Ms. Smith's. The Court believes that the language in 
No. 2 at Exhibit A was for other assets, but did not include the interest in 
the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partnership. 
R.181: 146(Trial Tr.); R.165-166. In making this ruling, the Trial Court did not find that 
the Smith Family Trust was ambiguous in any way, and no party argued that it was. 
Moreover, the Trial Court did not rely on any extrinsic evidence in its ruling. Rather, the 
ruling was solely a legal interpretation of the language of an unambiguous trust-a legal 
conclusion that this Court reviews for correctness. The Trial Court's interpretation was 
. ··' 
in error. The language of the Financial Account Provision is clear and is not susceptible 
to the limitation imposed by the Trial Court. The Brokerage Accounts are clearly 
"financial accounts" equally divided between the parties, and this Court should reverse 
the portion of the Trial Court's order awarding the Brokerage Accounts solely to Sharon 
and remand to the Trial Court to split those Brokerage Accounts equally between the 
parties. 
I. The Trial Court Erred By Interpreting the Financial Accounts Provision As Not 
Applying to the Brokerage Accounts. 
When interpreting a trust, the Court's primary object is "to carry out the intent of 
the trustor or trustors." Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ,, 27-28, 285 P.3d 815,823 
(quoting In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1982)). Where the trust is written, "the 
5 
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.t 
intention of the settlor must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may 
not go outside of the language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was." 
Makoff v. Mako.ff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974); see also Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 
1127-28 (Court should determine the trustors' intent solely from the language of the trust 
instrument, and "may only look beyond that language if the trust is ambiguous." (internal 
citations omitted)). "If the language within the four comers of the [trust] is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the [trust] 
language, and the [trust] may be interpreted as a matter oflaw." Hull, 2012 UT App 223 
at 1127-28 (quoting McNeil Eng'g & Land Surveying, LLC v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, 
18, 268 P.3d 854). 
To determine whether a trust is ambiguous, Utah Courts apply the same standards 
that are applied to other contracts. See Mako.ff, 528 P .2d at 798. Utah Courts "consider 
each [trust] provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to 
all and ignoring none." Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28 ( quoting McNeil Eng'g, 2011 
UT App 423, 18, 268 P.3d 854). "A [trust] term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable 
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Id. 
The Smith Family Trust at issue is not ambiguous, and was interpreted by the Trial 
Court as a matter of law. The interpretation chosen by the Trial Court was erroneous, as 
it cannot be reconciled with the actual language of the Smith Family Trust. 
6 
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A. The Smith Family Trust is Not Ambiguous and Was Interpreted as a Matter 
of Law. 
This Court may interpret the Smith Family Trust de novo as a matter of law, as the 
Smith Family Trust is not ambiguous. Neither party ever argued that the Smith Family 
Trust was ambiguous, and the Trial Court did not find that it was. Rather, the Trial Court 
interpreted the language of the Smith Family Trust as a matter of law, and did not 
consider any extrinsic evidence. Because the Trial Court's interpretation was a legal 
matter, this Court reviews it de novo and gives no deference to the Trial Court's legal 
conclusions. See Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 121. 
This would be the correct result in any event, as the language of the Smith Family 
Trust at issue here is clear and unambiguous. The provision at issue, the Financial 
Accounts Provision, reads as follows: 
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all 
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all 
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or 
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 ( emphasis added). There are no missing terms, uncertain terms, or 
other facial deficiencies in the language, and Sharon has never argued that there are. See 
Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28. The Financial Accounts Provision states that it 
covers "all new accounts .. .in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " This language is comprehensive and all-
encompassing, and leaves no room for any financial accounts to be excluded for any 
7 
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reason. No ambiguity exists, and this Court is free to interpret the Financial Account 
Provision as a matter of law. 
B. The Financial Accounts Provision Applies to the Brokerage Accounts. 
The Trial Court interpreted the language of the Financial Accounts Provision to 
exclude accounts where the funds originated from distributions from the Limited 
Partnership. R.165-166. This was error. The language of the provision does not 
contemplate any exclusions at all, and cannot be read as distinguishing accounts based on 
the origin of the funds. When interpreting a contract, Utah Courts apply the ordinary and 
usual meaning of the words that are used. See S. Ridge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown, 
2010 UT App 23, 11, 226 P.3d 758, 759. In addition, a correct interpretation will 
harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions, and not favor one over the other. See 
.t 
Hull, 2012 UT App 223 at 1127-28. The literal language of the Financial Accounts 
Provision applies to all existing and future financial accounts of any kind at any financial 
institution-period. There is no room in the language to carve out the Brokerage 
Accounts. It was error for the Trial Court to interpret such a carve-out into the 
provision-effectively rewriting it post hoc for Sharon's benefit. Utah Courts "will not 
make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves" or "'avoid the 
contract's plain language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mountain States 
Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, 1 19, 52 P.3d 1179, 1185. Notably, the provision as written 
applies equally to both parties, is not onerous or one-sided, and is a rational division of 
assets (as it was when it was executed). It is only now, where the Financial Accounts 
Provision does not benefit her in this divorce, that Sharon wishes it to contain a carve-out 
8 
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in her benefit. The Trial Court's interpretation, which it perhaps viewed as equitable 
under the circumstances, is not correct or sustainable under the actual language of the 
instrument. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling should be reversed in that respect. 
C. The Limited Partnership Provision Is Not Rendered Meaningless By Giving 
Effect to the Financial Accounts Provision. 
The Trial Court accepted Sharon's argument that the provision of the Smith 
Family Trust allocating the Partnership Interest to her would be nullified if the Financial 
Accounts Provision were given effect. That provision allocates to Sharon 
all right, title and interest in and to the following: All interest of Sharon 
L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, an 
Arizona Limited Partnership. 
Sharon's argument is that distributions from the Limited Partnership are the "interest" 
that she has, and dividing financial accounts whose funds originated from those 
distributions ( even in part) would divest her of that interest. This is not true. An interest 
in a partnership is a bundle of rights-the right to control the partnership, direct the use 
of its assets, obtain information from the partnership, enjoy the tax benefits of losses and 
deductions, and receive both cash and in-kind distributions, among other things. See 
generally Arizona Rev. Stat. §29-301 et seq. All of those rights remained, and still 
remain, with Sharon, and are not impacted at all by the Financial Accounts Provision. 
Even the receipt of a cash distribution is not impacted by the Financial Accounts 
Provision. Sharon could take the distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything 
else. However, once Sharon placed it in a financial account, the account was joint 
property and half of the account belonged to Keith. This is the limited area in which 
9 
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Sharon agreed to give away that benefit of the Limited Partnership, but it does not render 
the provision meaningless. Also, as previously mentioned, that impact applied equally to 
both parties. Keith's inheritances or business earnings were equally divisible once placed 
into a financial account. The Financial Accounts Provision is fair and rational, and its 
implementation does not conflict with, or render meaningless, any other provision of the 
Smith Family Trust. 
D. The Extrinsic Evidence Also Supports Reversal. 
Finally, even if the Court were inclined to review extrinsic evidence, either to 
inform it about potential ambiguity or to reach the intent of the parties, that evidence 
supports Keith's interpretation. The Smith Family Trust was executed in 2006, and was 
written by an attorney retained by Sharon. R.181:25, 55-56(Trial Tr.). At the time, all 
. ., 
distributions from the Limited Partnership were going into joint accounts for common 
marital use-exactly what the Financial Accounts Provision requires. R.181 :58(Trial 
Tr.). The parties' actual conduct at the time the Smith Family Trust was executed is 
some of the most reliable indicia of intent-more so than Sharon's trial testimony as to 
her undisclosed subjective intent. See KeyBank Nat. Ass'n v. Sys. W. Computer Res., Inc., 
2011 UT App 441, ,r 18,265 P.3d 107, 112. That course of conduct confirms that the 
parties intended financial accounts to be jointly owned, regardless of the origin of the 
funds. It also confirms that sharing distributions does not divest Sharon of the enjoyment 
of her Limited Partnership Interest, or she presumably would not have shared them in 
2006. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Because the Trial Court's interpretation is not supported by the plain language of 
the Smith Family Trust, does not harmonize its provisions, does not reflect the parties' 
intent, and is even unsupported by the extrinsic evidence, the Trial Court's ruling 
interpreting the Smith Family Trust should be reversed and remanded to divide the 
Brokerage Accounts equally between the parties. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By:_~_--=3LJ__ _ _ _ 
Michael D. Black 
Attorneys for Appellant 
11 
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THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST 
INCLUDING 
THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST AND 
THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST 
ARTICLE I 
TRANSFER IN TRUST 
For good and valuable consideration, the Trustors, Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. 
Smith, husband and wife, of Grantsville, State of Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the 
Trustees and their successors the property listed in Schedule "A", annexed hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash, 
securities or other property which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions 
hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property being hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate", for the uses and purposes and upon the 
terms and conditions herein set forth. 
A. 
ARTICLE II 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
It is understood that the Trustors or any other person may grant and the 
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and personal property by 
assignment, transfer, deed or other conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary 
or inter vivas, for inclusion in the Trust herein created. 
B. The Smith Family Trust shall be divided into two separate Trusts, The 
Keith L. Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust. Any additional property received 
by the Trustee shall become a part of the Trust into which It is transferred and shall 
become subject to the terms of this Agreement. If such property is not specifically 
appointed to any particular Trust, it shall be allocated equally between The Keith L. 
Smith Trust and The Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and 
otherwise to the Shelter Trust set forth herein. Property held in the name of "THE 
SMITH FAMILY TRUST' shall be allocated equally between the two Trusts and shall be 
subject to the respective provisions in the next two sentences. Property held as "THE 
KEITH L. SMITH TRUST11 is the exclusive property of Keith L. Smith, and Sharon L. 
-~ 
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vi; < __ ) 
Smith hereby expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and 
separate property interests, therein. Property held as "THE SHARON L. SMITH 
TRUSTn is the exclusive property of Sharon L. Smith, and Keith L. Smith hereby 
expressly waives all interests, including community property interests and separate 
property interests, therein. 
C. Unmatured life insurance policies transferred to the Trust at the death of 
either of the Trustors shall be allocated to the Shelter Trust and shall be under control of 
the Trustees of that Trust, except if the insured is a Trustee of that Trust; then the 
control shall rest solely in the Co-Trustee named or with the successor Trustees named 
after the insured. 
ARTICLE Ill 
SIGNATURES 
The Truster, Keith Lance Smith, has signed his name and is known by his whole 
name or by a portion thereof only or by a certain combination of names and the initials 
thereof. The Truster, Sharon Lynn Smith , has signed her name and is known by her 
whole name or by a portion thereof only or by certain combinations of names and initials 
thereof, and also by the name o1Jv1rs. Keith L. Smith, and a portion only of said name or 
the initials thereof. Regardless of what combinations of the names and signatures of 
the Trustors appear on past, present or future written documents, the names and 
signatures of the Trustors, as written below, are intended by the Trustors and shall be 
effective to transfer and convey the property listed in said written documents into this 
~ Trust. 
ARTICLE IV 
GOVERNING LAW 
vj The validity of this trust and the construction of its beneficial provisions shall be 
governed by the laws of the State of Utah in force from time to time. Questions with 
regard to the construction and administration of the trusts contained in this Agreement 
shall be determined by reference to the laws of the State in which the trust is then 
(rd} currently being administered. 
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ARTICLEV 
NO BOND REQUIRED 
No Trustee named herein need give bond in any jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's bond 
may not be dispensed with, the Trustors request that the bond be accepted without 
surety and in the lowest possible amount. In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee 
shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court, or 
obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power or discretion 
herein given. 
ARTICLE VI 
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT 
A. As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right, 
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke their separate 
Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part including this Trust, concerning the 
property that each has contributed to the Trust, in whole or in part, also including the 
principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such 
revocation shall be by an instrument in writing signed by the Trustors and shall be 
effective upon signing without notice to any successor Trustee. After the first of the 
Trustors has died, the survivor may amend or revoke only the Survivor's Trust 
provisions pertaining to the assets transferred therein by the surviving Truster, and may 
not, however, amend or revoke the QTIP Marital Trust. The Shelter Trust shall continue 
as an irrevocable Trust and will be administered and distributed as set forth herein. On 
the death of the survivor of the Trustors. the remainder of the Trust Estate and the 
Trusts created hereinafter shall become irrevocable. 
B. While any of these Trusts remain revocable, the Trustors may, in their 
discretion, make such use of the funds or properties of these Trusts as they may deem 
prudent, and such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and 
approval of the Trustees as though a formal writing were submitted in accordance with 
the provisions above. 
C. The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust 
subsists, the Trust properties and all rights and privileges thereunder shall be controlled 
and exercised by the Trustees named herein. 
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ARTICLE VII 
STATEMENT OF INTENTION 
It is specifically the intention of the Trustors that all real and personal properties 
now owned by the Trustors are to be a part of this Trust; provided further, that all future 
real and personal properties acquired by the Trustors are to be a part of, or to 
automatically become a part of, this Trust at the time acquired by the Trustors. 
ARTICLE VIII 
INEFFECTUAL PROVISIONS 
If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining 
provisions, nevertheless, shall be carried into effect. 
ARTICLE IX 
GENDER 
In any provision of this Trust Agreement, the masculine includes the feminine 
and vice versa, and the neuter includes the masculine or feminine and vice versa. 
Where applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice versa. 
.. t ARTICLEX 
PERPETUITIES SAVINGS CLAUSE 
In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstanding, the 
Trust created in this Agreement shall be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in 
place in the jurisdiction governing this trust. 
In the event of the termination of this Trust as provided for herein, the Trustee 
shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted, together with any net 
income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the 
same proportions in which they are entitled to such income. 
ARTICLE XI 
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION 
After any of the Trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the interests of each 
beneficiary in income and principal shall be free from the control or interference of any 
creditor of such beneficiary or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent of a 
child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or be subject to assignment 
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either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each and every beneficiary under this Trust and the 
various estates created hereunder is hereby restrained from and shall be without right, 
power or authority to sell, transfer, assign, pledge, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, 
anticipate, bequeath or devise, or in any manner affect or impair his, her or their 
beneficial right, title, interest, claim and estate in and to either the income or principal of 
any trust created hereunder, or to any part thereof, during the entire terms of said trusts; 
nor shall the right, title, interest or estate of any beneficiary be subject to any right, 
claim, demand, lien or judgment of any creditor of any such beneficiary, nor be subject 
nor liable to any process of law or equity, but all of the income and principal, except as 
otherwise provided in this Trust Agreement shall by the Trustee be payable and 
deliverable to or for the benefit of only the named and designated beneficiaries, as set 
forth in this trust agreement, and receipt by such beneficiaries shall relieve the Trustee 
from responsibility for such good faith distributions. This spendthrift clause shall not be 
construed to limit in any way the survivor of the Trustors' rights to income or principal 
under the Shelter Trust or the Marital Trust. 
ARTICLE XII 
PARTIES DEALING WITH TRUSTEES 
No purchaser and no issuer of any stock, bond or other instrument evidencing a 
. . t ---· 
deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the Trustees tiereunder with 
respect to any property hereunder, as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or lease or 
in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to 
the disbursing of money paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any 
particular1 but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the 
same basis as though the Trustees were the absolute owner of the said property, 
without any conditions, restrictions or qualifications whatsoever. 
ARTICLE XIII 
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
When a Trustor is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this Trust 
Agreement due to death, resignation or incompetence, the remaining Truster shall serve 
as Trustee. 
When the original Trustors are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee under this 
Trust Agreement due to death, resignation or incompetence, the successor Trustees in 
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the order of succession set forth in Article XXVII shall serve as Trustees. For all 
purposes of this Trust, each Trustee shall continue to be deemed mentally competent, 
unless determined not to be competent by two physicians selected by the Co-Trustee or 
the successor Trustee. The physicians shall not be liable for any determination made 
as to the competency of the Trustee if the determination is made in a reasonable 
manner. 
ARTICLE XIV 
POWER OF THE TRUSTEES 
A. The Trustees shall have full power to do everything in administering these 
Trusts that they deem to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it 
be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority) 
including, but not limited to, the following: 
1. To buy, sell and trade in securities of any nature, including short 
sales and on margin, and for such purposes may maintain and operate margin 
accounts with brokers, and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them 
with such brokers as security for loans and advances made to the Trustees, and 
to acquire by purchase or otherwise and to retain, so long as they deem 
advisable, any kind of realty or personal property or undivided interests therein, 
including common and preferred stocks, bonds or other unsecured obligations, 
options, warrants, interests in limited partnerships, investment trusts and 
discretionary common trust funds, all without diversification as to kind or amount, 
without being limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of trust 
funds, and power to hold or take title to property in the name of a nominee; 
2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public sale, exchange, 
hypothecate, sell short or otherwise dispose of any real or personal property; 
3. To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement, 
including distributions to themselves as Trustees, in kind or in money or partly in 
each, even if shares be composed differently. For such purposes, the valuation 
of the Trustees shall be given effect, if reasonably made; 
4. To withhold from distribution, in the Trustee's discretion, at the time 
for distribution of any property In this trust, without the payment of interest, all or 
any part of the property, as long as the Trustee shall determine in the Trustee's 
discretion that such property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0 
0 
0 
deficiencies, or to liabilities, contingent or otherwise, properly incurred in the 
administration of the estate. 
5. If, in the Trustees' discretion, any beneficiary (whether a minor or of 
legal age) is incapable of making proper disposition of any sum of income or 
principal that is payable or appointed to said beneficiary under the terms of this 
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of the 
beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by payments on behalf 
of the beneficiary to anyone with whom the beneficiary resides, by payments in 
discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any 
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary directly. The 
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the 
beneficiary or the duty of any person to support the beneficiary and without the 
intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the 
Trustees shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by any adult person, or any other 
person for a purpose other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and 
particularly so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support 
and education of said beneficiary; 
6. To determine whetl)er and to what extent receipts should be 
deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent expenditures should be 
charged against principal or income," and what other adjustments should be 
made between principal and income, provided such adjustments do not conflict 
with well-settled rules for the determination of principal and income questions; 
7. To delegate powers to agents including accountants, investment 
counsel, appraisers! legal counsel, and other experts, remunerate them and pay 
their expenses, to employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks 
and other assistants and pay them out of income or principal; 
8. To execute or enter into contracts, deeds, agreements or any other 
documents of any nature whatsoever which the Trustees deem necessary or 
desirable to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Trusts, to renew, 
assign, alter, extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or 
submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against 
the Trustors, the Trustees or the trust assets; 
9. To borrow money from others or from the Trustees, for the payment 
of taxes, debts or expenses, or for any other purpose which, in the opinion of the 
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Trustees, will facilitate the administration of these Trusts, and pledge or 
mortgage property as security for any such loans, and if money is borrowed from 
any Trustee Individually, to pay interest thereon at the then prevailing rate of 
interest; 
10. To lend money to any person, including the probate estate of either 
Truster, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear 
a reasonable rate of interest. 
11. To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to begin presently or 
in the future, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable duration of 
any Trust, to erect or alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property, 
demolish buildings, make ordinary and extraordinary repairs, grant easements 
and changes, make party wall contracts, dedicate roads, subdivide, adjust 
boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money for equity of 
partition; 
12. To operate, either solely or in conjunction with others, any business 
operation or enterprise of any nature, whether it be an individual business, 
general or limited partnership or corporation, for as long a time and in such a 
manner as the Trustees deem proper for the best interests of the Trust, with full 
power to organize and/or operate as a sole proprietorship or partnership, to 
incorporate such business or to execute or join in any plan of refinancing, 
merger, consolidation or reorganization thereof with full power to borrow monies 
as the Trustees may deem advisable for the purposes thereof; 
13. To charge to operating expenses all current costs of amortization, 
obsolescence and depreciation of any properties of the Trust and to provide 
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation; 
14. To effect and keep in force life, fire, rent, title, liability or casualty 
insurance, or other insurance of any nature, in any form, and in any amount; 
15. To enter into transactions with any other trusts in which the 
Trustors or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, or any of them, have 
beneficial interests, even though any trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee 
under this Trust Agreement; 
16. To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in conjunction with 
others, even though any of the Trustees are personally interested in the property 
that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or 
self-dealing; 
8 
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17. To invest in common trust funds, to hold and invest the funds of all 
Trusts in solido without a physical division of the assets, as the Trustees in their 
discretion may determine. 
18. To consolidate, for the purposes of unified administration only, the 
assets of any trust created herein with the assets of any other trust created 
herein, to the extent it declares the same to be the best interest of the respective 
trust. Furthermore, there need be no physical segregation or division of the 
various trusts, except segregation or division may be required by the termination 
of any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate accounts for the different 
undivided interests: 
19. To take any action and to make any election, in the Trustee's 
discretion, to minimize the tax liabilities of this trust and its beneficiaries and it 
shall have the power to allocate the benefits among the various beneficiaries, or 
between the income and principal accounts, to compensate for the 
consequences of any tax election or any investment or to administrative decision 
that the Trustee believes has had the effect of directly or indirectly preferring one 
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others. 
B. Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee at any time by 
delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries of a Trust then subsisting. 
C. Any Trustee may, from time to time, delegate to one or more of the 
remaining Trustees any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be a 
writing delivered to the delegate or delegates and shall remain effective for the time 
therein specified or until earlier revocation by a further writing similarly delivered. 
Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the 
certificate of any Trustee as to whom the Trustees are acting for and as to the extent of 
their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
D. From the income of the Trusts hereby created or, if that be insufficient, 
from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in 
the administration of the Trusts. 
E. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of any prior 
Trustee. 
F. The Trustee shall be prohibited from making any payments in 
reimbursement to any governmental entity which may have incurred expenses for the 
benefit of a beneficiary, and the Trustees shall not pay any obligation of a beneficiary 
9 
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which obligation is othetwise payable by any governmental entity or pursuant to any 
governmental program of reimbursement or payment. 
ARTICLE XV 
COURT SUPERVISION NOT REQUIRED 
All trusts created under this Agreement shall be administered free from the active 
supervision of any court. 
Any proceedings to seek judicial instructions or a judicial determination shall be 
initiated by the Trustee in the appropriate state court having original jurisdiction of those 
matters relating to the construction and administration of trusts. 
ARTICLE XVI 
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS 
A. During the lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall account only to the 
Trustors and their written approval shall be final and conclusive in respect to 
transactions disclosed in the account as to all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn 
and contingent beneficiaries. After the death of one of the Trustors, the Trustee shall, in 
addition to any accounting required under applicable law, render an accounting, from 
time to time, but not less frequently than annually, regard«ng the transactions of any 
trust created in this instrument. Accountings shall also be rendered by any Trustee 
within 30 days after his resignation or removal by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
8. Accountings shall be made by delivering a written accounting to each 
beneficiary entitled to current income distributions or, if there are no current income 
beneficiaries, to each beneficiary entitled to any current distribution out of income or 
principal, and each remainderman in being. If any person entitled to receive an 
accounting is a minor or is under a disability, the accounting shall be delivered to his 
parents or the guardian of his person if he is a minor or to the guardian or conservator 
of his person if he is under any other disability. Unless any beneficiary, including 
parents, guardians or conservators of beneficiaries, shall deliver a written objection to 
the Trustee within sixty (60) days after receipt of the Trustee's accounting, the account 
shall be final and conclusive in respect to transactions disclosed in the accounting as to 
all beneficiaries of the trust, including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. After 
settlement of the accounting by agreement of the parties objecting to it, or by expiration 
of the sixty (60} day period! the Trustee shall no longer be liable to any beneficiary of 
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the trust, including unborn and unascertained beneficiaries, in respect to transactions 
disclosed in the accounting, except for the Trustee's intentional wrongdoing or fraud. 
ARTICLE XVII 
CERTIFIED COPIES OF TRUST 
To the same effect as if it were the original, any person or institution may rely 
upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this instrument and any 
schedules or exhibits attached hereto. Any person or institution may rely upon any 
statement of fact certified by anyone who appears from the original Trust, or a certified 
copy thereof, to be a Trustee hereunder. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
DEATH 
If either of the Trustors has a serious illness or operation, the Trustors request 
that the Trustees call J. RANDALL RICHARDS, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to obtain instructions in case either of the Trustors should die. If death makes this prior 
conversation impossible, then the Trustees should call said attorney as soon as 
possible. 
ARTICLE XIX 
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS 
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been 
executed as an original. One of these executed copies is in the possession of the 
Trustors, and the other is deposited for safekeeping with J. RANDALL RICHARDS, 
Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah. Either copy may be used as an original without 
the other and, if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found, then it shall be 
considered as the original and the missing copy will be presumed inadvertently lost. 
Clarifications or instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by 
calling said law firm. 
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ARTICLE XX 
PROVISIONS RELATING 
TO POLICIES OF INSURANCE 
In the event the Trustee is named the beneficiary under any policies of 
insurance, said Trustee shall hold the same, subject to order of the owner of the policy, 
without obligation other than the safekeeping of any policies which may be delivered to 
the Trustee. 
The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges with respect to 
said policies. Upon receiving possession of insurance policies, proof of death of the 
insured, or upon maturity of any policies prior to the death of the insured, the trustee 
shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums payable on such policies for which the 
Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance settlements as received by the 
Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid by the insurer, 
which shall be classed as income. The Trustee may compromise, arbitrate or otherwise 
adjust claims upon any of the policies. The receipt of the Trustee to the insurance 
company shall be a full discharge of the company. 
The Trustee shall not be responsible for payment of any insurance premiums or 
any act or omission of the insured or the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall not be 
required to prosecute any action, to collect any insurance or to defend any action 
.. 
relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified against costs and expenses, 
including attorney's fees. 
ARTICLE XXI 
DISPOSITION DURING JOINT 
LWESOFTHETRUSTORS 
During the joint lives of the Trustors, the Trustees shall hold, manage, invest and 
reinvest the Trust Estate, and shall collect the income thereof and shall dispose of the 
net income and principal as follows: 
A. Income. The Trustees shall pay to the Trustors all of the net income of 
this Trust, in monthly or other convenient installments, but at least semi-annually. 
B. Principal. The Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or apply for the 
benefit of the Trustors, in addition to the income payments herein provided for, such 
amounts of the principal of the Trust Estate, up to the whole thereof, as the Trustees 
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may from time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of the 
Trustors. 
C. lncapaci1y. If, in a Trustee's sole and absolute judgment. either of the 
Trustors is so incapacitated by reason of illness, age, or other cause that he or she is 
incapable of handling funds for his or her own use and benefit, or if unavailable to give 
prompt attention to his or her financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net 
income and principal of the Trust Estate as the Trustee, in Trustee1s sole and absolute 
discretion, deems necessary or advisable, (1) for the comfort, support, maintenance, 
health and education of said incapacitated Truster and any person who, in the judgment 
of the Trustee. is dependent upon said incapacitated Truster, (2) for the payment of 
premiums on any insurance policies owned by said incapacitated Truster, whether or 
not subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement, and (3) for the purpose of discharging 
any debt or obligation incurred by said incapacitated Truster and believed by the 
Trustee to be a valid debt including, but not limited to: home rental/mortgage payments, 
utilities, installment obligations and established charitable contribution customs. 
A. 
ARTICLE XXII 
DISPOSITION AFTER DEATH 
OF THE FIRST OF THE TRUSTORS 
At the death of the first of the Trustors (and in case of simultaneous 
deaths, this Trust will operate as if the wife had survived the husband), after payment of 
currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and funeral out of the decedent1s 
Estate, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into three separate Trusts, hereinafter 
designated as the "Marital Trust", the "Shelter Trust" and the "Survivor's Trust11 , 
respectively. 
B. The Marital Trust shall consist of a fractional proportion in all property of 
the first of the Trustors to die that qualifies for the marital deduction determined as 
follows: 
1. The numerator of such fractional proportion of the Trust Estate shall . 
be the smallest amount which, if allowed as a marital deduction, would result in 
the least possible federal estate tax being payable as a result of the Truster's 
death, after allowing for the unified credit against federal estate tax and all 
available credits and deductions claimed. 
13 
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The numerator shall be reduced by the value of any other property which 
passes to the Truster's spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction other 
than the trust property. 
2. The denominator of this fraction shall be the value of the entire trust 
property._ Values assigned to property for purposes of this computation shall be 
those values finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The Trustee 
shall have the power to distribute assets, in cash or in kind, to the respective 
Trusts and to select specific property to be distributed to the respective Trusts 
without regard to the income tax basis of such property. In making these 
allocations, the Trustee shall use the value of the assets as of the date or dates 
of distribution, so that each distribution shares proportionately in the appreciation 
or depreciation of assets between the date of the Trustor's death and the date or 
dates of distribution. However, no allocation of assets shall be made to the 
Marital Trust which do not qualify for the marital deduction. The Trustee shall 
have the power to select specific property to be distributed to the Trusts without 
regard to the income tax basis of such property. To the extent that other assets 
which qualify for the marital deduction are available, there shall not be allocated 
to the Marital Trust: {a) assets with respect to which an estate tax credit for 
foreign taxes paid is allowable; (b) United States Treasury Bonds that are eligible 
for redemption at par value in payment of the federal estate tax. In computing 
the marital deduction, all generation-skipping transfers for which the Truster is 
the "deemed transferor11 shall be disregarded. 
C. The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees separately in trust for the 
following purposes: 
1. The Trustee shall collect the income on said Trust and pay or apply 
for the surviving spouse the net income thereof, in quarterly or other convenient 
installments (but at least annually}, for and during the term of said surviving 
spouse's life. 
2. Any remaining trust corpus shall be added at the death of the 
surviving spouse to the Shelter Trust and shall be held and administered as a 
part thereof; provided, however, that the Trustees shall first pay from the Marital 
Trust the last illness and funeral expenses and any death taxes of the survivor of 
the Trustors. 
D. The Survivor's Trust shall consist of the property which is the exclusive 
ownership of the surviving spouse, such as said surviving spouse's interest in all 
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community property and separate property belonging to said survivor or said survivors 
Trust. Said Trust Estate is under the full control of the surviving Trustor and, if not 
appointed otherwise, shall, upon the death of the surviving spouse, be distributed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Shelter Trust. 
E. The Shelter Trust shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining 
after setting aside all property of the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust 
and Survivor's Trust. The Shelter Trust shall be subject to the payment of all the death 
taxes of the first of the Trustors to die and shall be held by the Trustees separately in 
trust for the following purposes: 
1. The Trustees may distribute the income of the Shelter Trust among 
the issue of both of the Trustors as the survivor of the Trustors may appoint. 
2. During the lifetime of the surviving Truster, the Trustees of the 
Shelter Trust may distribute to said survivor such part or all of the net 
unappointed income and principal of the Shelter Trust as said Trustee, in his sole 
discretion, determines necessary or appropriate for the support and maintenance 
of said survivor in the standard of living to which the surviving Truster is 
accustomed, including reasonably adequate health, medical, dental, hospital, 
nursing and invalidism expenses. The powers herein granted to the surviving 
Truster, while serving as a Trustee or Co-Trustee of this Trost Agreement, shall 
be limited as follows: The surviving Trustor shall have no right to determine the 
amount of any income or principal of the Shelter Trust to be retained or to be 
distributed to said survivor or to distribute such but such determination and 
distribution shall be made by the Trustee or Trustees serving with the surviving 
Truster. If such survivor is serving as sole Trustee of this Trust Agreement, then 
said determination and distribution shall be made by the successor Trustee or 
Trustees named immediately after the Trustors in this Trust Agreement. 
3. The surviving Trustor shall have the unrestricted power at any time 
to invade the principal of the Shelter Trust (nonmarital trust) annually, to the 
extent of the greater of the following amounts: a) the sum of $5,000 orb) 5% of 
the fair market value of the property of the Shelter Trust determined by the 
Trustee as of the end of the month immediately preceding the request. This 
power shall be noncumulative and the power with respect to each year shall, if 
not exercised, lapse on the last day of each calendar year the power is held. The 
exercising of this power shall be made in writing by said surviving Truster to the 
Trustee. 
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4. Upon the death of the surviving Truster, the Trustees shall dispose 
of the unappointed remaining principal and income of the Shelter Trust as 
directed in Article XXIII. 
F. Statutory interests, if any, of the survivor of the Trustors, in his or her 
spouse's real and personal property, is hereby expressly waived by both of the Trustors. 
G. If this Trust is named beneficiary under any retirement plan, then such 
amounts so received shall be held pursuant to the provisions of Article XXII, paragraph 
E, provided further, that no federal estate nor state inheritance taxes nor any debts or 
liabilities of the deceased Truster/plan participant may be paid from such proceeds. 
H. If the Trustors or any primary and secondary beneficiary die 
simultaneously or under such conditions that it cannot be determined from credible 
evidence which of them was the first to die, the provisions made herein for the surviving 
spouse shall be construed as though the Truster-wife survived the Truster-husband. 
Any secondary beneficiary shall be deemed to have predeceased the primary 
beneficiary. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF 
THE SURVIVING TRUSTOR 
All Trust principal, with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed 
of under the provisions herein, shall, upon the death of the survivor of the Trustors, be 
held in Trust for the benefit of the following beneficiaries of the Trustors and shall be 
disposed of as follows: 
A. An amount determined by the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall be 
set aside from the balance of the funds held in Trust and shall be used for the support, 
maintenance, health insurance or to meet the costs of any illness or accident and 
education of the beneficiaries of this Trust as determined by Article XXIII, paragraph C1 
who have not reached age 21 prior to the death of the survivor of the Trustors. 
Education of the beneficiaries shall include, but not be limited to, musical education, 
dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school, college, graduate school, trade 
school, private school and vocational training school. 
In determining the amount to be set aside under the provisions of this paragraph 
and the amounts to be paid therefrom, the Trustees shall take into account the needs, 
ages, assets and other available sources of income and support of the beneficiaries, 
including each beneficiary1s ability to contribute to his or her own support. The Trustees 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0 
0 
0 
shall determine the amounts to be distributed, the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom 
distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of distributions made under this 
paragraph and shall distribute according to the various needs of the beneficiaries, even 
if such distributions are unequal. After the youngest beneficiary described in paragraph 
B herein has attained age 21, the balance, if any, of the amounts set aside under this 
paragraph shall be distributed according to Article XXIJI, paragraph C. 
B. In the event Rachel Ann Smith is under 18 years of age, the Trustees shall 
set aside in Trust, the real property last used as the·principal residence of the Trustors, 
for the benefit of Rachel until such time as she attains 18 years of age. The Trustees 
shall also set aside a sufficient amount of money to pay all expenses related to the 
upkeep of the principal residence. When Rachel turns 18, the Trustees shall distribute 
the principal residence according to the provisions set forth in paragraph "C11 below. 
C. After setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the purposes of Article 
XXIII, paragraph A, above, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Estate into as many equal 
shares as there are children of the Trustors then living and children of the Trustors then 
deceased but leaving surviving issue; provided further, that each of said shares, if not 
immediately distributed, shall constitute and be held, administered and distributed by 
the Trustees as a separate Trust, as follows: 
1. One such share shall be set aside for the benefit of each of the 
children of the Trustors who may then be living and, if held in Trust, shall 
constitute the Trust Estate of such child's Trust. 
2. One such equal share of the Trust Estate shall be set aside for the 
benefit of the surviving issue, by right of representation, of each of the children of 
the Trustors who may then be deceased but leave issue surviving and, if held in 
Trust, shall constitute the Trust Estate of such issue's Trust; the amounts so set 
aside may be used for the purposes and benefits as enumerated in Article XXI 11, 
paragraph A, above. 
3. As each above-described beneficiary attains age 21, the share of 
the Trust Estate for said beneficiary shall be distributed to him or her free and 
clear of Trust, upon his or her request therefore, as follows: 1/3 of the Trust 
Estate shall be distributed to each beneficiary when he or she has attained the 
age of 21; 1/2 of the remaining balance of the Trust Estate shall be distributed to 
each beneficiary when he or she has attained the age of 25; and the remaining 
balance shall be distributed to each beneficiary upon attaining age 30. 
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D. Whenever used herein. the terms 11issue11 , "child", "children" and 
"descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child, adopted children and adopted 
descendants, as well as natural issue, natural child, natural children and natural 
descendants, and include descendants of adopted issue. adopted child, adopted 
children and adopted descendants. 
E. · If any of the above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion 
of the Trust Estate, then the Trustees shall distribute the portion of the property of that 
beneficiary to his or her issue by right of representation and, if none, then to the other 
Trust beneficiaries proportionate to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust and, if no 
remaining beneficiaries, then: one-half to the living heirs at law of the first of the 
Trustors to die and one-half to the living heirs at law of the last. of the Trustors to die; 
provided further, that said heirs at law of each of the Trustors shall take the Trust 
property in the same priority and in the same distributive order as listed in the law of 
intestate succession of the state referred to in Article I as in force on the date of the 
signing of this Trust Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF A TRUSTOR 
A. On the death of a Truster, the Trustee is authorized, but not directecf to 
pay the following: 
1. Expenses of the last illness, funeral and burial of such Trustor. 
2. Legally enforceable claims against such Truster or such of Trustor's 
estate. 
3. Expenses with regard to the administration of such Truster's estate. 
4. Federal estate tax, applicable state inheritance or estate taxes. or 
any other taxes occasioned by the death of such Truster. 
5. Statutory or court ordered allowances for qualifying family 
members. 
6. The payments authorized under this Article are discretionary, and 
no claims or right to payment by third parties may be enforced against the trust 
by virtue of such discretionary authority. 
7. The Trustee shall be indemnified from the trust property for any 
damages sustained by the Trustee as a result of the Trustee exercising, in good 
faith, the authority granted the Trustee under this Article. 
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8. If the Trust created herein holds United States Treasury Bonds which are 
eligible for redemption at par in payment of the federal estate tax, the Trustee shall 
redeem such bonds to the extent necessary to pay federal estate tax as a result of such 
Truster's death. 
C. This paragraph shall be utilized to help facilitate the coordination between 
the personal representative of a Truster's probate estate and the Trustee with respect to 
any property owned by the Trustors outside of this Trust Agreement on such Truster's 
death. 
.. t 
1. The Trustee, in the Trustee's sole and absolute discretion, may 
elect to pay the payments authorized under this Article either directly to the 
appropriate persons or institutions or to the personal representative of such 
Truster's probate estate. 
The Trustee may rely upon the written statements of such Truster's 
personal representative as to all material facts relating to these payments; the 
Trustee shall not have any duty to see to the application of such payments. 
2. The Trustee is authorized to purchase and retain in the form 
received, as an addition to the Trust, any property which is a part of such 
Truster's probate estate. In addition, the Trustee may make loans, with or 
without security, to such Truster's probate estate. The Trustee shall not be liable 
for any loss suffered by any Trust created herein as a result of the exercise of the 
powers granted in this paragraph. 
3. The Trustee is authorized to accept distributions from the personal 
representative of an Truster's probate estate without audit and the Trustee shall 
be under no obligation to examine the records or accounts of the personal 
representative of such Truster's probate estate. 
ARTICLEXXV 
TRUSTEE'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE TAX ELECTIONS 
The Trustee may exercise any available elections with regard to state or federal 
income, inheritance, estate, succession, or gift tax law. 
A. Alternate Valuation Date. The authority granted the Trustee in this Article 
includes the right to elect any alternate valuation date for federal estate, state estate or 
inheritance tax purposes. 
B. Tax and Returns. The Trustee may also: 
1. Sign joint tax returns. 
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2. Pay any taxes, interest or penalties with regard to taxes. 
3. Apply for and collect tax refunds and interest thereon. 
C. All expenses, taxes and claims shall be paid without apportionment, and 
without reimbursement from any person. 
ARTICLE XXVI 
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS 
All personal properties listed on the Personal Property List are to be distributed to 
the named designees and such items shall be conveyed to such persons in addition to 
their respective distributive shares of the Trust described herein. 
A. 
B. 
ARTICLE XXVII 
TRUSTEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS 
The present living children of the Trustors and their birth dates are: 
Keith Lance Smith, Jr. September 18, 1980 
Loren James Smith November 8, 1985 
Sarah Lynn Smith Goodwin April 21, 1988 
Rachel Ann Smith April 6, 1993 
The following people shall seiv~ as·'frustees: 
1. Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith, Trustors, as Co-Trustees of 
The Smith Family Trust. 
2. Keith L. Smith, Granter, as Trustee of The Keith L. Smith Trust. 
3. Sharon L. Smith, Granter, as Trustee of The Sharon L. Smith Trust. 
4. When a Granter is unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the 
remaining Granter shall seive as Trustee. 
5. When neither Granter is able or willing to seive as Trustee, the 
following persons are appointed as Trustees in the following order 
of succession: 
a. K. Lance Smith. 
b. Matthew Swenson. 
c. A Trustee chosen by a majority of beneficiaries, with a 
parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. 
C. Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act concurrently, a 
majority of the Trustees, whether individual or corporate, shall have the power to make 
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any decision, undertake any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts 
created herein. In the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the decision 
of a majority of them shall prevail, but the dissenting or nonassenting Trustees shall not 
be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to ~uch decision. After the 
death of the first of the Trustors to die, if only two individual Trustees are in office, they 
must act unanimously. If an individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the 
determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. 
D. Each Successor Trustee shall have the same duties and powers as are 
assumed in this Trust Agreement. 
E. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any act, omission, or default of a 
predecessor Trustee. Unless requested in writing within sixty (60) days of appointment 
by an adult beneficiary of the trust, no successor Trustee shall have any duty to 
investigate or review any action of a predecessor Trustee and may accept the 
accounting records of the predecessor Trustee showing assets on hand without further 
investigation and without incurring any liability to any person claiming or having an 
interest in the trust. 
A. 
ARTICLE XXVIII 
SPECIAL TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
As used throughout this Agreement, the word Trustee shall refer to the 
original Trustee as well as any single, additional, or successor Trustee. It shall also 
refer to any individual, corporation or other entity acting as a replacement, substitute, or 
added Trustee. 
B. After the death of the first of the Trustors, the surviving Truster shall have 
the right, from time-to-time, to discharge any Trustee or Successor Trustee of any trust 
hereunder and to appoint a successor as Trustee in its place. Upon the death of the 
surviving Trustor1 the unanimous consent of the then Beneficiaries of all Trusts then 
established shall be sufficient to discharge any Trustee or Co-Trustee and appoint a 
successor Trustee or Co-Trustee. Discharge of a Trustee shall be by delivering to such 
Trustee thirty (30) days notice of discharge accompanied by the name of the intended 
Successor Trustee. The Trustee of any trust hereunder, including any Successor 
Trustee, may resign by delivery of ninety (90) days' written notice of resignation to all of 
the then income beneficiaries of such trust. In the event of such resignation, such 
income beneficiaries who are adults shall have the right to appoint a Successor Trustee 
in its place; provided, that if no such income beneficiary is an adult, then such 
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appointment shall be made by the parent or legal guardian of such income beneficiary; 
provided further, that in the event of dispute among such income beneficiaries, their 
parents or their guardians,, the majority shall prevail. 
C. As long as any individual named in this instrument shall serve as Co-
Trustee of these trusts, that individual shall have the power from time-to-time to 
delegate to the other Co-Trustee all or any of his powers as Co-Trustee during 
temporary vacation periods or other temporary periods. The power of delegation shall 
be exercised by delivery by the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written 
notice specifying the powers delegated; this delegation shall terminate on delivery by 
the individual Co-Trustee to the other Co-Trustee of written notice of termination of 
delegation. The individual Co-Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the 
Trust Estate as a result of any action taken or not taken within the scope of delegation 
during the period of delegation. 
D. The Original Trustee or Co-Trustees shall receive no compensation for 
ordinary services performed hereunder. The Successor Trustee or Trustees, whether 
corporate or noncorporate, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation for 
seivices rendered by them or counsel retained by them, including services in 
connection with the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or successor Trustees and the 
appointment"of sllCcessor Trustees. Reasonable compensation shall be based upon 
the then prevailing rates charged for similar services in the locality where the same are 
performed by other fiduciaries engaged in the trust business or acting as Trustees. 
E. The Trustee may abandon any real or personal property which may be 
determined to be worthless; any such determination by the Trustee shall be binding 
upon all parties interested hereunder. 
F. If an individual Co-Trustee is unable to participate in trust activities 
because of illness, disability, or any other reason, the remaining Trustee may, during 
any such incapacity, make any and all decisions regarding the Trust Estate as though it 
were the sole Trustee. In determining the disability of the individual Trustee, the 
remaining Trustee may rely on a certificate or other written statement from two licensed 
physicians who have examined the individu·a1 Trustee. In the absence of such a 
certificate or statement, the remaining Trustee shall petition the court having jurisdiction 
over this trust for authority to proceed as sole Trustee; under authority of this paragraph. 
The remaining Trustee shall incur no liability to any beneficiary of the trust or to the 
individual Trustee as a result of any action taken under this paragraph. 
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G. This trust is created upon the express understanding that the issuer 
(including transfer agents) or custodian of any shares of stock or mutual funds shall be 
under no liability whatsoever to see to its proper administration; and that upon the 
transfer of the right, title and interest in and to said shares by any Trustee hereunder, 
said issuer or custodian shall conclusively treat the transferee as the sole owner of said 
shares. In the event that any shares, cash, or other property shall be distributable at 
any time under the terms of said shares, the said issuer or custodian is fully authorized 
to pay, deliver and distribute the same to whosoever shall then be Trustee hereunder, 
and shall be under no liability to see the proper application thereof. The issuer or 
custodian is authorized to make such distributions under a mutual fund systematic 
withdrawal plan as have been specified by any Trustee acting hereunder. Until the 
issuer or custodian shall receive from some person interested in this trust written notice 
of any death or other event upon with the right to receive may depend, the issuer or 
custodian shall incur no liability for payments made in good faith to persons whose 
interests shall have been affected by such event. The issuer or custodian shall be 
protected in acting upon any notice or other instrument or document believed by it to be 
genuine and to have been signed or presented by the property party or parties. The 
Trustee shall have the right to pledge the shares as collateral for any loans made to the 
trust or to any Trustors. 
H. During the lifetime of the Trustors, they shall have the power in their 
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional investment counsel 
of their choice, provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least 
five other accounts of similar size. Any investment counsel designated by the Tru·stors 
or either of them shall continue to be retained in that capacity after the death of the 
survivor of the Trustors. In the absence of compelling circumstances to the contrary or 
except as provided below. On the death or legal disability of the surviving Truster, each 
child of the Trustors who has attained the age of 25 shall have the power, in his 
discretion, to direct that the Trustee employ a reputable professional _investment counsel 
of his choice (provided that the investment counsel shall currently be handling at least 
five other accounts of similar size) to supervise the investment of the trust set aside for 
that child and his issue. 
The Trustee shall abide by the decision of the independent counsel with 
respect to property placed under his control, but shall not be held liable or otherwise 
surcharged for losses directly attributable to investments made on the advice of the 
independent counsel. During the period that independent counsel is retained by the 
23 
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Trustee, the Trustee shall not be required to conduct reviews of estate or trust 
investments subject to the supervision of the investment counsel, and it shall be 
required to take no action in respect to those estate or trust investments unless it shall 
receive written instructions from the investment counsel. 
In the event investment counsel is obtained, the Trustee's fees for its 
ordinary services in respect to property subject to supervision of the investment counsel 
for the period the counsel is retained, shall be reduced a reasonable amount to take 
account of the absence of investment responsibility in respect to that property. 
ARTICLE XXIX 
NO CONTEST PROVISION 
Trustors specifically desire that the trusts created by this document shall be 
administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary 
of this trust, or any other person, shall seek to establish or asse,rt any claim to the Trust 
Estate established herein, other than as provided in this document, or to attack, oppose, 
or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the Trust Estate other than as 
herein set forth, then and in such event, such person or persons who shall initiate such 
action shall receive from the Trustees the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no more in lieu 
of any interest in the Trust Estate. 
ARTICLEXXX 
S CORPORATION STOCK 
A. In the event any Trust created under this Trust Agreement owns stock in 
one ( 1} or more S Corporations as defined under Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (or any successor Act provision), as amended or supplemented, the 
following shall apply. Such Trust shall be divided into two {2) parts, held as separate 
shares. One {1) part shall consist of all assets allocated to such Trust except stock in 
any S Corporations. This part shall be held and administered in accordance with the 
provisions of the Article creating the Trust. The balance of the assets, composed of 
only S Corporation stock, shall be maintained as separate equal shares for each of the 
primary beneficiaries, each of which such separate shares will constitute a Qualified 
Subchapter S Trust for the benefit of the said primary beneficiary as provided in the 
Article of this Trust Agreement creating such Trust. For purposes of this Article, the 
term primary beneficiary shall mean the individual currently entitled to receive income 
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and/or principal from the Trust (but shall not include dependents of such person unless 
specifically named as a beneficiary of such Trust). Except for this provision establishing 
the separate Qualified Subchapter S Trust hereunder, all other provisions of the Article 
establishing such Trust shall be applicable, except to the extent that the following 
specific requirements shall be applicable to such Trust. It is the Trustors' intention that 
each such separate share holding the S Corporation stock shall constitute a Qualified 
Subchapter S Trust, as defined in Internal Revenue Code Section 1361 (d)(3), as 
amended or supplemented, and as such, the following specific requirements shall be 
applicable to each of such separate shares: 
1. All income of each such separate share shall be distributed to the 
primary beneficiary who shall be the income beneficiary of such separate share. 
2. During the life of the current income beneficiary, the.re shall be only 
one {1) income beneficiary of each such separate share. 
3. The current income beneficiary of each such separate share shall 
be a citizen or resident of the United States. 
4. Any corpus distributed during the life of the current income 
beneficiary may be distributed only to such beneficiary. 
5. The income interest of the current income beneficiary in the 
separate share shall terminate on the earlier of ·sucfi beneficiary's death or the 
termination of the Trust. 
6. Upon the termination of the Trust during the life of the current 
income beneficiary, the Trust shall distribute all of the assets held as a separate 
share to such beneficiary. 
B. The provisions of this Article shall apply regardless of whether the election 
to be taxed as an S Corporation was made prior or subsequent to the Truster's death. 
ARTICLE XXXI 
GUARDIAN'S EXPENDITURES 
The Trustors do not desire, after their death, that the guardian of any minor 
beneficiary should incur personal expense in the support and maintenance of such 
beneficiary. The Trustee is authorized to disburse funds from such beneficiary's Trust 
Estate for the purpose of reimbursing such guardian for reasonable expenses incurred 
in supporting and caring for such minor beneficiary. 
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A. 
ARTICLE XXXII 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Use of principal residence. On the death of the first of the Trustors, the 
surviving Trustor shall have the right to continue to occupy and use the home, that the 
surviving Trustor and the deceased Trustor were using as a principal residence (if it is 
part of the Trust Estate), provided, however, that the surviving Trustor, in his or her 
discretion, may direct the Trustees to sell any such property and replace it with or rent 
or lease another residence selected by the survivor of the Trustors of comparable or 
lower value. The surviving Truster shall not be required to pay any rent for the use of 
said residence. 
B. Simultaneous Death. If there is not sufficient evidence that the Trustors 
died otherwise than simultaneously, then for purposes fo this Trust Agreement it shall 
be conclusively presumed for all purposes of administration and tax effect of this Trust 
that the Decedent shall be the Husband and the Survivor shall be the Wife. 
C. Limitations of Trust Powers. Administration control and all other powers 
relating to the various Trust Estates created hereunder, shall be exercised by the 
Trustee in a fiduciary capacity and solely for the benefit of the survivor and the issue of 
the Trustors. Neither the Trustee, the Trustors, nor any other person, shall be permitted 
to purchase, exchange, reacquire or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal of 
any of the various Trust Estates or the income therefrom, for less than an adequate 
interest in any case or without adequate security therefor. Any person holding a 
fiduciary power hereunder may release or reduce the scope of his power or may 
disclaim any part or all of such power. 
D. Headings. Clause headings are not part of this Trust Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustors have executed this Trust Agreement 
on the _42.__ day of September, 2006, as Trustors and Trustees: 
SHARON L. SMITH 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of 
September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith. 
My commission expires: 
.t 
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SCHEDULE "A" 
KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer, 
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Granters 
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated the£ day of September, 2006, 
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the 
exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST, property listed as SLS is the 
exclusive property of THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS & 
SLS is owned equally by the two Trusts. 
1. All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real 
estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and 
future water and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all pre"sent and all 
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located: 
Ownership 
SLS A. Lot 12, Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps 
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
Tax Parcel No.: 08-023-0-0011 
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH 
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2. The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all future 
additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the 
accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other 
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. Tooele Federal Credit Union 
Account No. 59643 
Prime Share 
Premier Money Market 
Budget Shares 
Choice Plus Checking 
3. Vehicles: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. 
KLS & SLS B. 
2002 Chevrolet 
Vehicle Identification No.: 2G1WF55K429192721 
Utah Title No.: UT3900266 
1990 Chevrolet 
Vehicle Identification No.: 1 GBEG25K0L7161875 
Utah Title No.: UT1370813 
4. All right. title and interest in and to the following: 
SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership. 
Dated the Jg_ day of September, 2006. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of 
September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith. 
My commission expires: 
., 
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SCHEDULE "A" 
KEITH L. SMITH and SHARON L. SMITH, Granters, do hereby sell, transfer, 
convey, quitclaim and assign for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, all rights, title and interests in the property set forth below to the Grantors 
as Trustees of THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST, dated the~ day of September, 2006, 
Grantee. In addition, property listed under the ownership category as KLS is the 
exclusive property of THE KEITH L. SMITH TRUST, property listed as SLS is the 
exclusive property of THE SHARON L. SMITH TRUST, and property designated KLS & 
SLS is owned equally by the two Trusts. 
1. All present and future interest of the Undersigned in the following real 
estate, together with all present and future improvements thereon, and all present and 
future wafer and water rights thereunto belonging and also including all present and all 
future personal property located thereon or wheresoever located: 
Ownership 
SLS A. Lot 12, Castagna Acres Subdivision, as described in the plat maps 
and records on file at the County Recorder's Office, Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
Tax Parcel No.: 08-023-0-0011 
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH 
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2. The following accounts in the following institutions. together with all future 
additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all new accounts and the 
accumulations and the future additions, interest or accumulation in any and all other 
financial institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. Tooele Federal Credit Union 
Account No. 59643 
Prime Share 
Premier Money Market 
Budget Shares 
Choice Plus Checking 
3. Vehicles: 
Ownership 
KLS & SLS A. 
KLS& SLS 8. 
2002 Chevrolet 
Vehicle Identification No.: 2G1WF55K429192721 
Utah Title No.: UT3900266 
1990 Chevrolet 
Vehicle Identification No.: 1 GBEG25K0L7161875 
Utah Title No.: UT1370813 
4. All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
., 
SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership. 
Dated the Jg_ day of September, 2006. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this~ day of 
September, 2006, by Keith L. Smith and Sharon L. Smith. 
My commission expires: 
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782) 
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
291 NORTH RACE STREET 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
KEITH SMITH 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 134300466 
Commissioner Michele Tack 
Judge Robert W. Adkins 
The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on 
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action. 
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was 
present with his attorney Michael D. Black. 
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having found 
proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, Utah for at 
least three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
2. The parties were married on December 15, 1979, in Maricopa County, Arizona, are 
husband and wife and maintained their marital domicile in Tooele County, Utah. 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
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3. There are irreconcilable differences existing as to both parties and both parties are 
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable difference. 
., 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional 
2. 
3. 
4. 
attachments to items of their son, Jarom, but the court will 
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting will 
remain with Petitioner and the chest will remain with 
Respondent. 
The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as 
they now possess it. 
REAL PROPERTY 
During the marriage the parties purchased a home together 
located at 203 Quirk Street, Grantsville, Utah, 84029. 
The Court finds that the home was transferred to the Smith 
Family Trust to protect the home from the Respondent's 
potential liabilities. Respondent had been engaged in a 
business which entailed a higher than normal degree of risk. 
So the Court finds that the house was transferred to protect it 
from potential liabilities, but that the house remained a marital 
asset. 
5. The house should be sold and the proceeds.of the sale should 
2 of 8 
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be divided as follows: 
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company 
costs should be paid before dividing any proceeds; 
b. The remaining proceeds will be divided equally between the parties with the 
following caveats: 
i. The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00 
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on 
December 5, 2015, that there will be deducted from his share of the 
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February 
2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
ii. 
.• r 
Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation 
sessions in the amount of $1,125.00. The Respondent 
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of 
$562.50, which will be deducted from his share of the 
equity. 
iii. Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from 
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above. 
6. The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is 
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent should 
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well 
as all utilities associated with the home while living there. 
3 of 8 
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Respondent should pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month. 
The Respondent should take good care of the home and 
should keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a 
condition that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by 
the parties. 
7. The parties should mutually agree upon the realtor selected to 
sell the home and each should cooperate to get the home sold 
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as 
ordered in paragraph 8(b). 
8 . If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the 
. , 
opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being 
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by 
providing the Court with the information from the realtor. 
9. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that 
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home will not 
be granted. Respondent will be responsible for the $200.00 a 
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as 
previously ordered in paragraph B(b)(i), but no further 
recoupment will be ordered. 
INHERITANCE 
10. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 4of 8 
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( .. 
Court believes that the Partnership was an inheritance. The 
way the Court views it is that the Petitioner's mother helped 
the parties. The Court believes that the help was appropriate, 
that there was a need there, and that Petitioner's mother 
addressed that need. 
11. The court finds that all of the monies the came from the 
partnership and distributions out of the partnership, not 
including gifts from the mother that came from her personal 
assets, were the Petitioner's inheritance. 
12. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family 
.• t 
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A, 
which states "All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." 
13. The court believes that all interest of Sharon L. Smith in the 
Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership included 
distributions and they were simply part of the partnership. 
14. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to 
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner. 
15. The court believes the language of number 2 of Exhibit 
(Schedule A) was for other assets but did not include interest 
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C 
in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership. 
16. The Court finds that in order to pay family expenses, Petitioner 
used some proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came 
in. She used those for the family to survive. The court finds 
those amounts were comingled, but that she did not comingle 
the larger payment of $750,000.00 that was distributed from 
the partnership, and that remains as the Petitioner's sole and 
separate property. 
17. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly 
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole 
property of the Petitioner. 
ALIMONY 
18. The court understands the Respondent has medical 
circumstances and that he receives Social Security Disability 
in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a result of those 
circumstances. 
19. The Court finds that the Respondent has unmet needs. 
20. The Court finds that the Court, in this case, should look at 
separate property of the Petitioner in looking at the unmet 
needs of Respondent. 
21. The Court, in calculating Respondent's unmet needs, finds 
6of 8 
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2. 
that Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs, and 
therefore sets his needs at $1,700.00 per month. 
22. The Court finds that Respondent's income is $1,198.00 per 
month and that his unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month 
leaving a need for alimony in the amount of $502.00 per 
month. 
23. The court finds that Petitioner should pay alimony to 
Respondent in the amount of $502.00 per month, not to 
exceed the length of the marriage. Alimony should terminate 
upon death, marriage, or cohabitation by the Respondent. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
24. Each party should pay their own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as set forth above. 
The parties should be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. That the personal property should be awarded as set forth above. 
4. That the real property should be distributed as set forth above. 
5. That Petitioner's interest in the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership is her 
separate inheritance. 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 7 of 8 
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C. 
6. That the Zions account and the LPL account should be awarded as set forth 
above. 
7. That Respondent has an unmet need for alimony and that alimony should be 
awarded as set forth above. 
8. That attorney fees should be discharged as set forth above. 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
/s/ Michael D. Black 
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black 
Attorney for Respondent 
END OF ORDER 
··' In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4, 
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the 
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic 
signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
*********H********H***H*H**** 
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JAIME TOPHAM (11782) 
LAW OFFICE OF JAIME TOPHAM, PLLC 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
291 NORTH RACE STREET 
GRANTSVILLE, UT 84029 
TELEPHONE: (435) 884-3426 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON SMITH 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KEITH SMITH 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 134300466 
Commissioner Michele Tack 
Judge Robert W. Adkins 
The parties came before the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins on 
.. t 
February 12, 2015 for trial on the issues concerning the parties' divorce action. 
Sharon Smith was present with her attorney, Jaime Topham. Keith Smith was 
present with his attorney Michael D. Black. 
The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, heard argument, and having 
found proper grounds and jurisdiction, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: 
ORDERED,ADJUDGED,andDECREED 
1. The parties are mutually granted a divorce a divorce from one another on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, such to become final upon signature and 
entry herein. 
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PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. The court understands that both parties have emotional 
attachments to items of their son, Jarom, but the court will 
leave the assets where they are presently. The painting shall 
remain with Petitioner and the chest shall remain with 
Respondent 
2. The remaining personal property is awarded to each party, as 
they now possess it. 
REAL PROPERTY 
3. During the marriage the parties purchased a home together 
located at 203 Quirk Street, Grantsville, Utah, 84029. 
4. The house shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale shall be 
divided as follows: 
a. First, the mortgage and the costs of the sale to include realtor and title company 
costs shall be paid before dividing any proceeds; 
b. The remaining proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties with the 
following caveats: 
i. The court is ordering that because the Respondent didn't pay the $200.00 
per month under the Temporary Order, entered by the Court on 
December 5, 2015, that there shall be deducted from his share of the 
equity $200.00 per month starting September, 2014 and ending February 
March 26, 2015 06:36 PM 
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2015, for a total of $1,200.00; and 
ii. 
iii. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Petitioner paid the full cost of the parties' two mediation 
sessions in the amount of $1, 125.00. The Respondent 
shall pay half of the mediation expenses, in the amount of 
$562.50, which shall be deducted from his share of the 
equity. 
Petitioner shall be awarded the amounts deducted from 
Respondent's share of the equity as stated above. 
The Respondent may continue to live in the home until it is 
sold. If he chooses to remain in the home, Respondent shall 
continue to pay $200.00 a month toward the mortgage as well 
as all utilities associated with the home while living there. 
Respondent shall pay the $200.00 to Petitioner each month. 
The Respondent shall take good care of the home and shall 
keep it in condition where it can be shown and in a condition 
that is acceptable to the realtor that is selected by the parties. 
The parties shall mutually agree upon the realtor selected to 
sell the home and each shall cooperate to get the home sold 
so that the equity can be taken out of the home and divided as 
ordered in paragraph 4{b). 
If there is a problem that develops and the realtor is of the 
3 of 116_.. 0000. · • 
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C. 
opinion that the home is not being sold because it is being 
lived it, the parties can address the issue with the Court by 
providing the Court with the information from the realtor. 
8. Petitioner's request for $5,328.00 in mortgage payments that 
she paid while Respondent was residing in the home shall not 
be granted. Respondent is responsible for the $200.00 a 
month to be paid toward the monthly mortgage payment as 
previously ordered in paragraph 4(b)(i), but no further 
recoupment is ordered. 
INHERITANCE 
.t 
9. As to the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership, the 
Partnership was an inheritance. 
10. All of the monies the came from the partnership and 
distributions out of the partnership, not including gifts from the 
mother that came from her personal assets, were the 
Petitioner's inheritance. 
11. In trying to reconcile Exhibit (Schedule) A to the Smith Family 
Trust, the Court looked at number 4 on Exhibit (Schedule) A, 
which states "All right, title and interest in and to the following: 
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership, an Arizona Limited Partnership." 
4of7 
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12. All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Luveda Fincher Family 
Limited Partnership included distributions and they were 
simply part of the partnership. 
13. The Court is interpreting number 4 of Exhibit (Schedule) A to 
mean all the distributions belong to Petitioner. 
14. The language of number 2 of Exhibit (Schedule A) was for 
other assets but did not include interest in the Luveda Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership. 
15. In order to pay family expenses, Petitioner used some 
proceeds until 2012 when the large amount came in. She used 
those for the family to survive. Those amounts were 
comingled, but Petitioner did not comingle the larger payment 
of $750,000.00 that was distributed from the partnership, and 
that remains as the Petitioner's sole and separate property. 
16. Petitioner is entitled to funds in the Zions and LPL (formerly 
Edward Jones) account and the accounts are the sole 
property of the Petitioner. 
ALIMONY 
17. Respondent has medical circumstances and receives Social 
Security Disability in the amount of $1,198.00 per month as a 
result of those circumstances. 
oodffiss Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18. Respondent has unmet needs. 
19. Petitioner's separate property is considered in determining the 
unmet needs of Respondent. 
20. Respondent's declaration has overstated his needs. 
Therefore his needs are set at $1,700.00 per month. 
21. Respondent's income is $11 198.00 per month and that his 
unmet expenses are $1,700.00 per month leaving a need for 
alimony in the amount of $502.00 per month. 
22. Petitioner shall pay alimony to Respondent in the amount of 
$502.00 per month, not to exceed the length of the marriage . 
. r 
Alimony shall terminate upon death, remarriage, or 
cohabitation by the Respondent. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
23. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this action. 
Approved as to Form and Content 
/s/ Michael D. Black 
Electronically signed by Jaime Topham with permission of Michael D. Black 
Attorney for Respondent 
END OF ORDER 
In accordance with the Utah State District Court's Efiling Standard No. 4, 
and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the 
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic 
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signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order. 
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SHARON 
KEITH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMITH, 
vs. 
SMITH, 
} 
) 
) ***PRIVATE*** 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
) Case No. 134300466 
) 
) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) ORIGINAL 
Bench Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 12, 2015 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBERT ADKINS 
Third District Court Judge 
.. t 
APPEARANCES 
For the Petitioner: 
For the Respondent: 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
Jaime D. Topham 
291 North Race Street 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
Telephone: (435) 884-3428 
Michael D. Black 
PARR, BROWN 
101 South 200 East, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
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1 has a bank account right at the moment or controls these bank 
2 accounts with some $600,000 in them. My client, on the other 
3 hand, is barely scraping by with his Social Security disability 
4 
5 
6 
7 
as his only income. So it seems pretty clear how that should 
come out to me. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Topham, you may call your 
first witness. 
8 MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor, I'd call Sharon Smith. 
9 THE COURT: Ma'am if you'd come forward and be sworn 
10 please. 
11 COURT CLERK: Please raise your right hand. Do you 
12 solemnly swear the testimony you shall give in this case shall 
13 be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
.t 
help you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
COURT CLERK: Have a seat. 
MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor, if I may approach. 
THE COURT: You may. Thank you. 
SHARON SMITH, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 BY MS. TOPHAM: 
24 
25 
Q. Good morning. Can you please state your name for the 
record. 
-10-
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A. Yes, he actually wrote it to me in a letter saying 
that it was that it was my inheritance. 
Q. So he understood that to be your inheritance? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Do you recall when he told you that? 
About 2005. 
Is that about the time that there was this turmoil? 
Yes. 
Q. Okay, you said that Keith quit running the business 
in 2005. Did he find employment after he quit his business? 
A. No, that's when we started seeing a marriage counselor 
and this counselor advised him that possibly he could go on 
disability. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay, did he end up getting disability? 
Yes. 
Okay, if you can turn to page 2 in that binder --
··' 
17 excuse me, in tab 2 of that binder in front of you, do you 
18 recognize that document? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
in 2006. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, this is the Smith Family Trust that we had done 
Did an attorney draft that trust for you? 
Yes. 
Had you ever dealt with the attorney before? 
No, he was just recommended by a mutual friend. 
Why did you and Keith want a trust? 
-25-
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Q. Do you know how much you earned last year? 
A. I don't remember; 6 -- maybe 6,000, something like 
that. 
Q. There has been talk of this inheritance. You said 
that your mom had passed away in 2011, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you receive a distribution from the partnership 
after that? 
A. Yes, in -- after she passed away the partnership had 
some property and so they sold that property and I received 
this large distribution in October of 2012. 
Q. What did you do with that? How did you receive it? 
A. I received it by check in the mail . 
Q. Was it addressed to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To anyone 
A. Only to me. 
Q. What did you do with that check? 
A. I took that check and deposited it into Zion's Bank 
into two money market accounts. 
Q. Were those accounts that had previously existed? 
A. No. 
Q. What was the purpose of opening those accounts? 
A. To make them distinguished from our joint account, and 
basically -- and then later --
-33-
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Q. Was it -- oh, I don't want to tell you. 
A. later put them -- put them in the trust, yeah. 
Q. So was it your intention to keep your inheritance 
separate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any option besides -- when you received 
that check, did you have any option but to open a financial 
account to deal with that check? 
A. Well, then later I -- after talking to several 
financial planners, then I invested part of it in -- with a 
financial planner in -- it's now in an LPL Finance -- it's LPL 
financial company. 
Q. Okay, but when you actually received the check, could 
., 
you just go and cash that check, or did you have to deposit it 
into a 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. -- a financial account? 
A. No, no. It has to -- it had to be -- no one would 
cash that big of a check. It had to be --
Q. So you had --
A. it had to be deposited. 
Q. Into a financial account? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Yes. 
-34-
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correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then the second one that's listed for Zion's Bank, 
are those the money market accounts you've been talking about? 
A. Yes, except for I initially had two, and now I only 
have one. 
Q. The current balance of those is listed at $171,068.19; 
is that correct? 
A. Approximate, yeah. It could -- it's probably lower 
than that, but approximate, yeah. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
On the next page, then, you have listed LPL Financial? 
Yes. 
That is the brokerage account? 
Yes, that's my investment, yes. 
That used to be Edward Jones, correct? 
Yes. 
That's listed-- has a balance of $422,159.21, correct? 
Correct. 
So if my math is correct, then, we're talking about 
$593,000 and change? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
More or less. 
More or less, okay. 
Mostly yes, probably. 
Q. Now, in 1999 I think you testified that you received 
distributions from family limited -- from your family partner-
-52-
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1 
2 
3 
4 
in Logan, and he -- he withdrew the -- the total amount of the 
loan the total amount of the $5,000 out of the bank account 
for the whole month, and that's when he was -- got mad at me 
and was upset at me because I had taken that job. 
5 So he went and withdrew that money out of the checking 
6 account, and he went and bought an old truck that he wanted, 
7 and he -- then he threatened divorce and said that -- excuse 
8 me. Then he later told me that he was testing me to see that 
9 -- basically to see that I loved money more than him, or some-
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
thing to that effect. 
Q. You were angry with him when he made that withdrawal, 
correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. In fact, because of that, you went to hire a divorce 
attorney at that time; is that right? 
A. That's right, because he said that he was going to get 
a divorce. So I decided I might as well go first. 
Q. But you worked that out in 2005? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then in 2006, it was -- the marital trust was an idea 
that you had come up with first; isn't that right? 
you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
You found the lawyer who was going to draft it for 
Well, he was a mutual -- a mutual friend recommended 
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him. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You were the one paying him to do this work? 
Yes. 
We've looked at a few of the provisions of that trust 
5 agreement, and I believe it is in front of you as Exhibit 2. 
6 I'd like you, if you would, to flip back to that Schedule A, 
7 which is right in the middle of this thing, but I believe it's 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
right after page 27. Can you --
A. I can't find it again. I realized I didn't like this 
one. Okay. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Have you found Schedule A? 
Schedule A or page 2? Oh, okay. 
Schedule A, the quitclaim document that we were -- you 
.t 
were discussing with your attorney earlier. Do you have that? 
A. No, I'm not sure I have the right one. There's too 
16 many Schedule A's. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. All right, I think it's the very first Schedule A in 
the series. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
it? 
A. 
Q. 
Oh, okay. Okay. 
All right, you're there with me? 
About the house? 
It's -- the first page has the house at the bottom of 
Yes. 
You talked about the operation and what the initials 
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Q. Well, what about those two initials needs -- requires 
interpretation? 
A. Because I think it means a joint account. 
Q. Well, do you see the word "joint account" anywhere in 
paragraph 2? 
A. No, but I still think it's a matter of interpretation, 
and I'm not a law-- I'm not an attorney to-- or a trust writer, 
and I just felt like that because you go down to like Jaime 
pointed out, and you go down to A, and it -- and it conflicts 
10 with what is said in 2. So I don't feel like that this -- I 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
don't feel like this guy wrote it very plainly that -- because 
it can be interpreted different ways. 
Q. But what I'm asking right now is under the ownership 
portion where it's got the line there that says "KLS and SLS, 
that would indicate that it is split jointly, correct? 
A. Okay, correct. 
Q. The Tooele Credit -- Federal Credit Union, that's the 
one that at that time you -- was a joint account with Keith? 
A. Yes. 
··' 
Q. That's the account at that time that the distributions 
from the partnership were going into? 
A. Yes. 
And any paychecks were going into? Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, in 2006 I didn't have a paycheck, but yes. 
Any income from his businesses would have gone into 
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18 
Q. 
right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay, but you guys went to therapy over the issue, 
We went to therapy over the issue of divorce? 
Over the issues that you were having? 
Yes. 
Sharon sought out a divorce at that time, correct? 
Correct. 
Ultimately, obviously, you did not divorce, right? 
Correct. 
When you went and -- when the trust was created, did 
you read that trust, the Smith Family Trust? 
A. No. 
Q • 
A. 
You signed -- did you sign the trust? 
Yes. 
Q. Can you turn in the white binder that's in plaintiff's 
exhibits -- or petitioner's exhibits, can you turn to the --
A. Are you -- oh, oh, I see. I understand. 
Q. Can you turn to the second trust agreement, second 
1 9 document? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. The one with --
Q. Yes. Can you turn to page 26. 
A. It doesn't have page num -- oh, now they're coming. 
Page 26? (i) 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. Is that your signature? 
Yes, it is. 
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Q. Can you turn three more pages. That would be page 2 
of Schedule A. 
A. Page 2 of Schedule A? 
Q. Yes, is that your signature on that page? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Earlier you testified the house had been previously --
prior to this trust, the house had been previously transferred 
to Sharon's name alone; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. When I was in business, I was afraid that being in 
environmental cleanup, that we would -- it's possible to get 
sued, and I did not want our personal assets endangered. 
··' 
Q. So it's your testimony that you had transferred the 
15 house out of your name into Sharon's alone, to protect the 
16 assets from creditors, correct? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. No, not from creditors. 
Q. From potential liability? 
A. Lawsuits. 
Q. Okay, from potential lawsuits. Your testimony is, is 
that happened long before the 2006 trust? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, are you sure about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall signing a quitclaim deed in October of 
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Let's first talk about the family trust and these 
financial accounts. As the Court is now seeing, there is this 
provision, this quitclaim schedule to the family trust, the 
Smith Family Trust that says that the parties are quit-claiming 
and deeding to the other one of those assets. One of those 
assets is the house, and that went to Sharon. 
No. 2 on the list of that quitclaim deed are financial 
accounts. As I read to the Court and as is plain from that 
agreement, it very clearly states that all financial accounts, 
10 whether they exist now, whether they exist in the future, 
11 whether they're at a different institution, whether they're 
12 at the same institution, and all additions and accumulations 
13 to those accounts are split equally, which was the custom of 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the parties at the time that they entered into that agreement. 
It's not -- it's not an ambiguous provisions. There's 
no room for interpretation in it. The petitioner's proposition 
that somehow the word "joint" should be stuffed into that --
into that language finds no support in the language that exists 
there. Her only argument as to a different interpretation for 
that language is the fourth item on that list, which as the 
membership interest itself in the partnership remains the 
petitioner's property. 
Those two things are not incompatible. The membership 
interest, the actual interest in the entity clearly remains 
with the petitioner, with Sharon. However, once those distri-
-129-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
butions come out, and they were getting them and they were 
using them for marital purposes, they were dividing them 
jointly. So it makes perfect sense that in that provision 
when we have talk of financial accounts, those financial 
accounts are split and are dealt with differently than the 
membership interest itself. 
Notably, the language describing the membership 
interest does not include proceeds, distributions or any 
sort of terminology of the like, even though it's clear that 
the attorney who wrote that provision knew how to use that 
language because he had used accumulations, additions and the 
like prior. 
So it's not -- it's not unclear at all, or ambiguous 
.t 
at all what the family trust and that particular quitclaim 
provision requires. These agreements, post-nuptial agreements, 
if we want to call them that or just agreements between married 
persons are enforceable like normal contracts, absent fraud, 
coercion or material non-disclosure. 
That's according to the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Daston v. Daston, 808 P2d. 111. They are interpreted and 
evaluated according to normal contract principals, including 
the principal that if it's unambiguous language, it's inter-
preted according to its normal and objective terminology and 
meaning of those words that are used. I think at the end of 
the day, looking at that provision and applying the contract 
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1 principals that apply in Utah, it is -- it's clear that it 
2 required that these financial accounts be divided between 
3 
4 
those parties equally. 
Even if we get beyond that point, there is the issue 
5 of comingling. Now, according to Kiter v. Kiter, 2010 Utah App 
6 169, so again the Utah Court of Appeals, premarital property 
7 
8 
loses its separate distinction when the parties have inextric-
ably comingled it, or when one spouse has contributed all or 
9 part of the property to the marital estate. 
10 So when we're looking at -- when I'm looking at co-
ll mingling in this circumstance, I think there's two aspects to 
12 
13 
14 
it. One is that the -- the inheritance money as a whole, the 
course of conduct of the parties shows that they were treating 
all of this inheritance money, all of this money that was 
15 coming in from this partnership, as a marital asset. The 
16 petitioner was putting it into a joint account. It was being 
17 used for marital purposes. It was being used to pay the mort-
18 gage, to pay normal bills. That satisfies the issue of co-
19 mingling as to the entirety of the inheritance that would come 
20 in. 
21 Also, when we're looking at comingling, we can look at 
22 just the period of time when the final distribution, the really 
23 large distribution comes in, and we can look at where did it 
24 go, and what accounts did it actually go into. 
25 So what the facts show is that Sharon had opened this 
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the parties. So I'm expecting both parties to cooperate to get 
the home sold so that the equity can be taken out of the home 
and divided as the Court has ordered. 
If there is a problem that develops, and if the realtor 
5 is of the opinion that the home is not being sold because it's 
6 being lived in rather than vacant, we can readdress that. 
7 Counsel can simply call the Court, and we can resolve that 
8 
9 
10 
issue, and you can provide me with the information from the 
realtor, and we can make a decision on that. 
As to the family partnership that was created --
11 MS. TOPHAM: Your Honor, could I interrupt just a 
12 moment? 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Certainly . 
MS. TOPHAM: You didn't actually state what -- how the 
15 proceeds would be ultimately divided. 
16 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, I intended that they would 
17 be divided 50/50 subject to those amounts that your client is 
18 going to recoup from Mr. Smith's portion of the equity. 
19 MS. TOPHAM: Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: That as to the family partnership, the 
21 Court believes that this was an inheritance, and the way the 
22 Court views it is that the petitioner's mother helped the 
23 parties, and the Court believes that that was appropriate. 
24 There was a need there that the petitioner's mother addressed, 
25 and that it's nice to have someone in the family that's in that 
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ability to assist when there is a need like this. 
The Court finds that the-- that all of the monies that 
came from the partnership, and that -- and I'm not including in 
there gifts from the mother that came from her personal assets 
5 rather than distributions out of the partnership, but as to the 
6 distributions out of the partnership, the Court believes that 
7 they were the petitioner's inheritance. 
8 In trying to reconcile Exhibit A to the Smith Family 
9 Trust, the Court is looking at No. 4 on Exhibit A, and it says, 
10 "All interest, title and interest in the following," and then 
11 
12 
13 
14 
it says, "All interest of Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher 
Family Limited Partnership, an Arizona limited partnership," 
and that was to go to Mrs. Smith. 
., 
The Court believes that all interest in the -- of 
15 Sharon L. Smith in the Lavida Fincher Family Limited Partner-
16 
17 
18 
19 
ship included distributions. That they were simply part of 
the partnership, and the Court is interpreting No. 4 to mean 
all those distributions were Ms. Smith's. The Court believes 
that the language in No. 2 at Exhibit A was for other assets, 
20 but did not include the interest in the Lavida Fincher Family 
21 
22 
Limited Partnership. 
The Court finds that in order to pay the family 
23 expenses that Ms. Smith used some of those proceeds up until 
24 
25 
I guess probably 2012 when the large amount came in. She used 
those to -- for the family to survive, and the Court believes 
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